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Maritime security is burdened by thousands of years afhistory and tradition. 
W e in the Coast Guard are reminded of this truism on a daily basis. One particularly poignant reminder came in October of 2002, a scant thir-
teen months after the 9/ 11 attacks. In the middle of a weekday afternoon, a fifty-
foot long boat pulled up near the Rickenbacker Causeway in Miami, Florida and 
offloaded 220 illegal aliens directly into the heart of downtown. Naturally, a news 
helicopter was overhead and the event was almost instantly broadcast nationwide. I 
The US Coast Guard is supposed to playa leading role in preventing these kinds of 
incidents, and the commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, Admiral Thomas 
Collins, ended up b riefing the secretary of transportation. After he was told of the 
incident, the secretary, in some disbelief, asked Admiral Collins, "How in the 
world did they get through?" The Admiral's reply was "Sir, with all due respect, 
how did they get through what?" 
This is an am using story for those of us in the maritime community because we 
have long known and accepted the openness and vulnerabili ties of our many port 
and coastal areas. It should be an instructive story fo r us as well, though, as it makes 
two important points. First, it dramatically reminds us of the vulnerability of these 
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crucial parts of our transportation and economic systems. Our ports are essential 
trans-shipment nodes that are responsible for 9S percent of our trade. Many are 
highly specialized; all have high concentrations of expensive, difficult to replace in-
frastructure. Most ports are in population centers-and all are economic engines. 
Yet securi ty has often been seen as an expensive obstacle, rather than an essential 
contributor, to the long-term, uninterrupted free flow of commerce. 
Second, the incident in Miami, and the Secretary of Transportation's reaction, 
tell us that we maritime professionals fall far short of the expectations of govern-
ment leaders and the populations they represent. The great majority of our leaders 
and citizenry are landsmen with no maritime experience at all. They are familiar 
with air travel, as a large portion of the population has traveled at least once by air-
plane. They know from movies and television that aircraft, airports, and the skies 
are monitored by radar operators, and that aircraft off course or in trouble can be 
quickly identified and assisted. Their experience at airports tells them that the flow 
of air traffic is orderly, efficient, fairly secure and much the same from one place to 
the next. Because few have experience with maritime transportation, they uncon-
sciously assume-and expect-that the kind of orderliness and security they see in 
aviation also exists at seaports and on the ocean. When they discover to the con-
trary, they are disappointed, and often wonder why it is that the maritime commu-
nity has not entered the modern age. 
A part of the answer is again that maritime security is burdened by thousands of 
years of history and tradition. Unlike aviation, which sprang to life as we know it 
today in less than a hundred years and which has a coherent, relatively complete ar-
chitecture of policies and supporting systems, maritime practices have evolved 
over centuries. Maritime policies and supporting systems have likewise evolved 
and have developed ad hoc. Unlike aviation where transparency has been the hall-
mark of safety and has been improved even more for security purposes, the mari-
time domain has long been marked by a culture of secrecy that now works against 
both individual community members and society as a whole. 
Policy and Systems Architectures 
The world's aviation system has a clearly articulated policy architecture and is sup-
ported by a well-developed systems architecture designed to monitor compliance 
and aid enforcement of the rules regulating flight operations. Maritime transporta-
tion, while there are local exceptions around the globe, has generally evolved over 
the centuries into a hodgepodge of interconnecting, often disparate policies, sup-
ported by semi- or completely incompatible sensor and information systems. 
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In the United States, the maritime domain is made even more complex by 
highly fragmented, some might say near chaotic, governance. A National Academy 
of Sciences study determined there were at least eighteen federal agencies that have 
responsibility for regulating some aspect of US maritime transportation and that 
there is little to no formal method of coordinating their efforts.2 Add to these fed-
eral agencies a variety of agencies and organizations from the individual states, 
coastal cities, specially commissioned port authorities, marine exchanges, private 
facility operators, etc., and you have a truly dizzying picture. It explains the old say-
ing that, "if you have seen one port, you've just seen one port." There are 361 com-
mercial seaports in the United States and all have different combinations of 
geography, governance, sensors, operating rules, ownership, mix of activities and 
so on. It is not a situation that easily lends itself to improvements in safety, security, 
or the efficient flow of commerce. 
While the attacks of September 11 were conducted through the aviation sys-
tem, the pre-existing aviation systems and policy architectures allowed for an ex-
ceptionally rapid and coordinated response. Near real-time visibility of the 
airspace of the United States and effective means of communication throughout 
the aviation system meant that the threat could rapidly be contained. Over five 
thousand aircraft were safely landed in less than two hours. Afterward, those same 
policy and system architectures provided forensics and made it very easy to insert 
policy changes and systems modifications to prevent further attacks. While one 
can debate whether or not those changes were the correct ones, once decided 
upon, they were easily and effectively implemented as a part of overall, coherent 
policy and systems structures. 
We do not have the same advantages in the maritime domain. There is no mari-
time equivalent of the National Airspace System Plan3 that details the various parts 
of the system and how they are to work together and ensure that each is appropri-
ately considered in governance. Maritime system policies, developed by eighteen 
different federal agencies, have no uniting structure and, in aggregate, have huge 
gaps. As one example, over thirteen million recreational craft have virtually unfet-
tered access to the nation's commercial and military harbors. While the individual 
states require that these boats be registered, many have no or lax titling practices, 
making boat registration much easier to obtain legitimately or fraudulently. And, 
unlike motor vehicle registrations, vessel data is not easily exchangeable and acces-
sible by enforcement officials. An enforcement officer in Florida, for example, has a 
very difficult time, if it can be done at all, verifying information for a vessel that ap-
pears to be registered in Michigan. Further, and most importantly, few boaters are 
currently required to know how to safely operate their vessel and understand mari-
time rules and regulations. Most states do not even require that a boat operator 
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carry personal identification. Imagine the im pact on highway safety and law en-
forcement if drivers were not only untrained and unlicensed, but not even required 
to carry photo identification. 
Compounding the lack of a complete and coherent maritime policy structure is 
a lack of systems to enforce those policies we do have. In 2003, four Cuban Coast 
Guard members decided they no longer wanted to work in Castro's Cuba. One 
night they drove their small patrol boat north until, at about three o'clock in the 
morning, they found the Hyatt Hotel marina in Key West, Florida. They walked 
around Key West for two hours until they located a patrolling police officer and 
surrendered.4 One can imagine them handing over their side arms and explaining 
that their AK-47s were still in the boat. Despite comprehensive laws that establish 
strict requirements fo r international maritime arrivals, our lack of adequate mari-
time slllveillance results in an average of fourteen successful, illegal, malicious in-
cursions into the United States each and every week. We can only hope that the 
damage is limited to landing illegal migrants, tons of narcotics, and the occasional 
well -armed Cuban Coast Guardsman. 
A Culture of Secrecy 
Another part of the burden of maritime history and tradition is a culture of secrecy. 
Dealers in commodities don't want competitors to know the sources and destina-
tions of their cargos. Fishennen don't want others to fish their favorite spots. Owner-
ship of commercial vessels is often concealed through a network of contracts and 
paper corporations. On the vast and largely ungoverned and unpoliced global com-
mons that are the world's oceans, being difficult to find has been key to protection 
from pirates, the navies of hostile nations, and others that would do a vessel harm. 
This tradition of secrecy, along with the nature of the sea and ships, has led to 
maritime transportation being the preferred vector for some of the world's most 
infamous and evil cargos. Slaves, contraband, narcotics, conventional weapons to 
start a new war, or a weapon of mass destruction to inflict terror, all these and more 
can be transported in greater quantities, and often with greater secrecy, by sea than 
by any other mode. Maritime commerce brings near limitless good to the world, 
but its culture of secrecy has allowed it to bring significant evil as well. 
The international community has always struggled to maximize the good and 
minimize the evil brought by maritime transportation. We want to take advantage 
of the sea's bounty to feed our children but don't want to destroy the fishing 
grounds and starve our grandchildren. We want to ensure the free flow of com-
merce but don't want illegal substances and people smuggled ashore. We want 
freedom of navigation, but are concerned that a vessel carrying thousands of tons 
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of explosive cargo can sail mere miles off our coast, en route from one foreign port 
to another, with no obligation to report its position or course, or obey our direc· 
tions. We are concerned that some day such a vessel will be transiting off one of our 
ports or a defense facility or a large city when it suddenly turns toward shore-and 
disaster will strike. 
We understand that in an information age security lies not in secrecy, but in 
transparency. And we are becoming convinced that it is time to begin shedding the 
burden of thousands of years of maritime history and tradition. 
So how shall this be done? Improving governance with a more coherent and sys-
tematic approach to maritime regimes (policies, rules, regulations, statutes) is cer-
tainly required. We must also ensure that sufficient patrol and enforcement assets 
are deployed to deter and respond to violations of those policies. First and fore-
most though, we must understand the maritime domain and what is going on 
within it, so that we can formulate good policy, effectively deploy assets and ensure 
the uninterrupted free flow of commerce. 
Maritime Domain Awareness--See, Understand, Share 
Our goal must be to achieve "[a]n effective understanding of anything in the mari-
time environment that can effect [sic] the safety, securi ty, economy, or environ-
ment of the United States," the definition of "maritime domain awareness" in the 
National Strategy for Maritime Securi ty.5 Achieving awareness will require that 
maritime activities and actors become more transparent, that what is seen is prop-
erly understood , and that this visibili ty and understanding be shared as widely as 
possible among members of the maritime community. 
s"'_ 
We must overcome the traditional culture of secrecy and make all activity and ac-
tors more transparent. Evil can dwell only in dark and hidden places. Transparency 
leads to self-correcting behavior by shining a light that exposes bad actors and rein-
forces the ethic of good ones. It levels the playing field by revealing the cheat and re-
moving his advantage. It improves safety and commerce by better informing users 
of hazards, conditions and routes. And it helps us focus scarce enforcement re-
sources in the most important areas. 
Understand. 
Watching the flow of maritime activities and actors is oflittJe use unless what is 
being seen can be understood. Decision makers must be able to differentiate a nor-
mal and innocent scene from one containing anomalies that deserve further 
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investigation. When available, intelligence, analysis and pattern recognition must 
be integrated into a context of broad situational awareness to understand motives 
and intent. The goal is to deter and prevent all threats and all hazards. Without un-
derstanding, the best surveillance system in the world will only be able to docu-
ment adverse events as they unfold. 
Share. 
If we are to be successful in our maritime safety, security, and stewardship efforts, 
we will need to harness the abilities, authorities, time and efforts of all stakeholders. 
"Unity of command" among various levels of our federal, state and local govern-
ments, agencies offoreign governments, industry partners, etc. is unachievable and 
undesirable. Rather, we must foster "unity of effort" in pursuit of our mutual goals 
and interests through proactive, aggressive information exchange. Sharing data, 
analysis, operating pictures and the like as broadly as possible (given appropriate 
security and permissions) will provide multiple benefits and help with at least two 
significant problems: 
• We don't know what we know. Information needed to make critical 
decisions often exists but is not available and correlated by those who might use it. 
Data that showed multiple men of foreign origin traveling with no luggage had 
purchased airline tickets shortly before flight time on four different airlines 
existed on the morning of September 11 , 2001. Had this data been available and 
shared widely in an aviation safety and security community that understood the 
potential threat, the world today might be a far different place . 
• The challenge of complexity. The pursuit of maritime safety, security and 
stewardship involves widely diverse players with far different sets of authorities, 
responsibilities and capabilities-and these players operate in unique and varied 
geographic and maritime locations. Shared awareness empowers each player and 
fosters unity of effort in dozens of ways, from better informing individual 
missions and avoiding "blue on blue" conflict, to drawing on the unconscious 
knowledge of local experts. Done properly, it enables each member of the 
maritime community to use shared data and knowledge to create a unique picture 
in support of its own needs and missions. This enables each to bring the full force 
of its unique authority, experience and expertise to the overall effort. 
The Way Ahead 
In the abstract, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a state of being, a goal that 
will never be completely obtained as we strive for ever greater understanding. More 
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concretely, it is something that mariners have been obtaining, to a degree, since the 
first dugout canoe was launched and people felt the pull of the current and the 
pressure of the wind. 
As now envisioned, Maritime Domain Awareness is a process that collects, 
fuses, and analyzes data about activities in, and the conditions of, the maritime en-
vironment and then disseminates the data gathered and analysis results to decision 
makers. Put another way, it's the ability to gather the information to detect what it 
is that's the threat, fuse the information to truly know that it is a threat, analyze it so 
that the necessary corrective action can be determined, and then be able to move 
that information to a command and control mode (the decision maker) to order 
the necessary action to be taken. It is a process that will be heavily dependent on 
technology, some of which currently exists, some of which will require develop-
ment. The "observablcs" on which information is collected include the characteris-
tics of the vessel and its history, information on the passengers, crew and cargo, 
infrastructure, sea lanes, threats and weather. The collection portion of the process 
will involve a wide variety of sources: sensors, both short and long range; open 
source; private sector; law enforcement; intelligence agencies; and, of course, our 
international partners. Our surveillance capabilities must be persistent and perva-
sive. Some of the sensor technology to meet this requirement already exist, e.g., radars, 
cameras and space-based imaging systems; however, nearly all existing systems re-
quire upgrades. Other technologies, including high-altitude, long-endurance un-
manned air vehicles; remotely piloted, unmanned surface and subsurface vessels; 
and aerostats and buoys equipped with a variety of sensors are possibilities for the 
future system. 
The next step in the MDA process is to fuse and analyze data gathered. Unless 
that can be accomplished in a timeframe that permits effective action to be taken 
against identified threats, the utility of the data will be limited. Processing the mas-
sivequanti ties of data in a timely manner to create actionable information presents 
an enormous challenge. Advanced, automated data-fusion technologies will be 
critical to the task, and these do not exist today except as advanced research and de-
velopment projects. 
Because MDA can only be achieved through a partnership of many government 
agencies, the dissemination of information between agencies and other stake-
holders is essential. Today the sharing of information among agencies is dependent 
on existing networks and communication processes. Unfortunately most of those 
systems were designed for intra-agency not inter-agency dissemination of infor-
mation. These communication difficulties are further compounded when 
nonfederal organizations are considered. While progress has been made, much 
needs to be done to develop networked information sharing using Internet-based 
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technologies that will be the key to ensuring that the necessary information is pre-
sented to operational commanders and other decision makers in a manner that en-
ables accurate, dynamic and confident decisions and responses to maritime threats. 
While much remains to be done to create the MDA process of the future, our 
awareness of activities in the maritime domain is better today than at any point in 
history. Much of that progress has been made in the five years since 9/11 . We now 
require major vessels in international trade to carry Automatic Identification System 
transmitters so that we can track their movements. US Customs and Border Pro-
tection's National Targeting Center has made huge progress in understanding the 
supply chain and tracking cargoes. The International Maritime Organization has 
agreed to a fundamental change in the world's view of information to which a 
coastal State is entitled concerning ships on international voyages. In 2008 coastal 
states will have the right under international convention to know about ships that 
are just passing by up to 1,000 nautical miles offshore.6 Yet our understanding of 
the sea and activities therein remains highly fragmented and contains huge gaps. 
To use an aviation metaphor from 9/11 , in the maritime environment there are still 
a lot of un-reinforced cockpit doors. We have a duty to do better. 
To do substantially better will require unity of effort across the entire maritime 
community. The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness/ ap-
proved by the White House in October of2005, envisioned such an effort and pro-
vided the first few tentative steps forward on what will be a continuing journey. In 
the two years since its approval, the interagency process has developed an MDA 
Concept of Operations that establishes both a maritime situational awareness en-
terprise and a national MDA governance structure. The new "Director, Global 
Maritime Situational Awareness" (GMSA) is an interagency position hosted by the 
Coast Guard. Along with the Director, Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (a 
pre-existing position within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), the 
GMSA director will co-chair an inter-department MDA Stakeholder Board that 
has responsibility for identifying needs, advocating for solutions and ensuring co-
ordination between departments and agencies. 
Complementing the progress in governance has been the rapid development of 
MDA technology and data sharing projects that are blossoming almost faster than 
they can be harvested. One especially noteworthy effort is the MDA Data Sharing 
Community ofIn terest. Jointly sponsored by the Coast Guard and US Navy, with 
technical advice from the Defense Department Chief Information Officer's office, 
the project is demonstrating the ease of data sharing in a publish-and-subscribe, 
network-centric environment that can accommodate members as diverse as local 
harbor police and national intelligence analysts. Even more importantly, it is 
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proving once again that technology is the easy part of the equation compared to ad· 
dressing political, process and people issues. 
Conclusion 
Maritime Domain Awareness is the key to Maritime Security. Our current 
awareness capabilities fall far short of where we could be-and should be-given 
available technologies and a reasonable willingness to work together. Our national 
security depends upon continued progress on a journey that has only begun. 
Moreover, the public expects we should already be far ahead of where we are. We 
should make best speed to meet, and then exceed, those expectations. 
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